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Abstract –We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are
connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network
influence the success of players in the other network. We find that the stronger the bias in the
utility function, the higher the level of public cooperation. Yet the benefits of enhanced public
cooperation on the two networks are just as biased as the utility functions themselves. While
cooperation may thrive on one network, the other may still be plagued by defectors. Nevertheless,
the aggregate level of cooperation on both networks is higher than the one attainable on an
isolated network. This positive effect of biased utility functions is due to the suppressed feedback
of individual success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales of the
evolutionary process on the two interdependent networks. As a result, cooperation is promoted
because the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive to the slowing down than the build-up
of collective efforts in sizable groups.
Introduction. – The study of evolutionary games on
networks and graphs (see [1] for a comprehensive review)
has proven very gratifying in terms of improving our un-
derstanding of the emergence and sustenance of cooper-
ation among selfish and unrelated individuals. Following
the seminal discovery that spatial structure may, unlike
well-mixed populations, maintain cooperation even in the
most challenging prisoner’s dilemma game [2], and the
many groundbreaking discoveries concerning the statis-
tical mechanics of complex networks and the dynamical
processes taking place on them [3, 4], the study of evolu-
tionary games on small-world [5], scale-free [6], coevolving
[7, 8] and hierarchical [9] networks, to name but a few,
now appears as having been the logical next step. From
these and many other related studies, we have learnt that
scale-free networks might be the missing link to coopera-
tion by virtually all main social dilemmas [10], and that
this is a very robust evolutionary outcome [11], although
not immune to the normalization of payoffs [12–15] and
targeted removal of nodes [16]. Moreover, heterogeneity
in general, i.e. not just in terms of players having differ-
ent degree within a network, proved to be very effective in
maintaining high levels of cooperation in the population
[17–23], and indeed many coevolutionary rules have been
introduced that may generate such states spontaneously
[24–34] (see [35] for a review).
Recently, however, it has been emphasized that, al-
though research on complex networks has been flourish-
ing and has become an integral part of many branches
of physics, the focus is predominantly still on single (or
isolated) networks [36]. In many ways this approach can
be considered as rather limited, since real networks are si-
multaneously present and influence each other, and should
thus be treated as interdependent networks. Several ex-
amples attesting to this fact are given in [37], while specif-
ically for evolutionary games, it is possible to argue that
the interaction network of players may be just as impor-
tant for their success as the network of institutions pro-
viding the funding, or the network of governmental bodies
overseeing that everybody is obeying the rules. More gen-
erally, the success of a player in a given network may not
depend just on the players in that same network, but may
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also depend on a player that is a member of another net-
work, thus lending ample justification to studying the out-
come of evolutionary games on interdependent networks.
Until now, however, seminal works on interdependent net-
works have shown that seemingly irrelevant changes in one
network can have catastrophic and very much unexpected
consequence in another network [36].
In this paper, we study the evolution of public cooper-
ation on two interdependent networks, which are linked
together by means of a utility function that is defined as a
combination of individual payoffs of related pairs of play-
ers selected from different graphs. In general, payoffs rep-
resent utilities that players try to maximize by adopting
strategies from others. There are, however, several real-
istic situations when our actions are not motivated solely
by our own wellbeing, but may also depend on the impact
they will have on others, e.g. the family or the closest col-
laborators. The determination of an accurate utility func-
tion is therefore demanding, typically involving the consid-
eration of fraternity, other-regarding preferences, or sim-
ply the behavior of relatives in biological systems [38–41].
Here, conceptually differently, we use the concept of utility
to link together two networks, for convenience denoted as
networks A and B, which therefore become interdependent
in a way that is paramount for the outcome of the game.
In particular, we define the utility of each player as a bi-
ased sum of the payoff of the player itself and the payoff of
the corresponding player in the other network. In this way,
players in network A consider the payoffs of players in net-
work B to be more relevant than their own, while players
in network B consider their own payoffs more prominently
than those of the players in network A. In order to focus
explicitly on the impact of this interdependence, and to
avoid potential effects stemming from complex networks,
we use the square lattice topology for both networks A
and B. This also enables us to compare the obtained re-
sults accurately with those reported previously on a single
network [42]. Moreover, due to the exactly defined loca-
tions of all the players, the potential complications with
defining who are the corresponding players in the two net-
works are naturally alleviated. Interestingly, we find that
the interdependence by means of biased utility promotes
the evolution of cooperation, yet that the extent of this
promotion itself is heavily biased in the two networks. Ac-
curate results that will be presented below firmly attest to
the fact that the integration of interdependent networks
and evolutionary games offers new ways of understanding
the successful evolution of cooperation, as well as provides
ample opportunities for further research along this line.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows.
First, we describe the considered public goods game and
the interdependence of the two networks due to the bi-
ased definition of the utility function. Next we present
the main results, whereas lastly we summarize them and
discuss their implications.
Fig. 1: Schematic presentation of the model. Players are ar-
ranged on two physically separated square lattices. Interdepen-
dence is introduced via the utility function, which determines
the probability of strategy invasion within a lattice, and is cal-
culated based not only on the player’s own payoff but also on
the payoff of its corresponding player in the other network. The
two payoffs are considered in a biased manner, as marked by
the different lengths of the vertical arrows. According to the
scheme, the utility function in the upper network A (red) is
determined predominantly by the payoffs in the lower network
B (blue), while the utility function in the lower network B is
only slightly influenced by the payoffs in the upper network
A. Importantly, strategy invasions are possible from nearest
neighbors only, as marked by the small arrows on both grids.
Model definition. – The public goods game on both
networks is staged on a L × L square lattice with peri-
odic boundary conditions, where players are arranged into
overlapping groups of size G = 5. Every player is thus sur-
rounded by its k = G− 1 nearest neighbors and is a mem-
ber in g = G different groups. Initially each player on site
x in network A and on site x′ in network B is designated
either as a cooperator or defector with equal probability.
The accumulation of payoffs Px and Px′ on both networks
follows the same standard procedure. Namely, in each
group cooperators contribute 1 to the public good while
defectors contribute nothing. The sum of contributions is
subsequently multiplied by the factor r > 1, reflecting the
synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount
is equally shared amongst the G group members. In each
group the payoff obtained is P g
x
on network A and P g
x′
on network B, while the total amount received in all the
groups is thus Px =
∑
g
P g
x
and Px′ =
∑
g
P g
x′
.
While the two networks are not physically connected,
interdependence is introduced via the utility functions
Ux = αPx + (1− α)Px′ , Ux′ = (1− α)Px′ + αPx , (1)
where α determines the bias in the consideration of payoffs
collected by the corresponding players x and x′ in the two
networks, as schematically depicted in Fig. 1. At low α
values player x is guided predominantly by the payoff of
player x′, while at α = 0.5 both Px and Px′ are taken into
consideration equally by both players x and x′. Evidently,
for α > 0.5 the roles are exchanged and the treatment
becomes fully symmetric. It is also worth emphasizing
that at α = 1 (α = 0) the game on network A (B) behaves
identically as if played on a single network [42], while the
p-2
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Fig. 2: Snapshots of the distribution of cooperators (green)
and defectors (red) on the two interdependent square lattices
at 0, 20, 2000 and 20000 MCS from left to right. Panels a-
d (surrounded red) correspond to results obtained on network
A, while panels e-h (surrounded blue) correspond to results
obtained on network B. Parameter values are: α = 0.01, r/G =
0.76 and L = 200.
game on network B (A) is completely guided by the payoffs
of players in network A (B).
Following the determination of utilities according to
Eq. 1, strategy invasions are attempted between nearest
neighbors on a given network (see Fig. 1). Accordingly, on
network A player x can adopt the strategy sy of one of its
randomly chosen nearest neighbors y with a probability
determined by the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Ux − Uy)/K]
, (2)
where the utility Uy of player y is evaluated identically
as for player x. The probability of strategy invasion from
player y′ to player x′ on network B is determined likewise,
only that utilities U ′
x
and U ′
y
are used. Without loss of
generality in Eq. 2 we set K = 0.5 [42], implying that
players with a higher utility spread, but it is not impossi-
ble to adopt the strategy of a player having a lower utility.
Simulations of the model were performed by means of a
random sequential update, where each player on both net-
works had a chance to pass its strategy once on average
during a Monte Carlo step (MCS). The linear system size
was varied from L = 200 to 800 in order to avoid finite
size effects, and the equilibration required up to 106 MCS.
Results. – We start by presenting characteristic
snapshots of the distribution of cooperators and defectors
on the two networks in Fig. 2. In order to demonstrate
the impact of biased utility as effectively as possible, we
use α = 0.01 and r/G = 0.76. According to Eq. 1, this
implies that the evolution on network A is guided pre-
dominantly (99%) by the payoffs of players in network B,
while the evolution on network B should be almost identi-
cal with the evolution on a single (isolated) square lattice.
By focusing first on the snapshots in the bottom row of
Fig. 2 (panels e-h), corresponding to the evolution on net-
work B, it can indeed be observed that the outcome is
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Fig. 3: Density of cooperators fC in dependence on the nor-
malized synergy factor r/G as obtained on networks A (closed
circles connected with a solid red line) and B (open circles con-
nected with a dashed blue line) for α = 0.01 (a), 0.40 (b) and
0.49 (c). The critical values of the synergy factor r2c, where
the pure C phase is reached on network A, are marked by small
red arrows at the top axis of each layer.
very much similar to the one on an isolated lattice. In
the stationary state (panels g and h) defectors dominate,
while a relatively small fraction of cooperators is able to
survive by forming compact clusters. This is in agreement
with previous results obtained for a single square lattice,
where cooperators can survive only if r/G = r1 ≥ 0.745
[42]. Much more surprising, however, is the outcome in
the upper row of Fig. 2 (panels a-d), corresponding to the
evolution on network A. There the stationary state (panel
d) is reached a full order of magnitude slower, yet instead
of widespread defection, cooperators dominate completely.
Thus, a strong bias in the utility function towards payoffs
of players in the other network (network B in this case)
significantly promotes the evolution of cooperation.
Results presented in Fig. 3 evidence clearly that the
difference in the evolution of public cooperation on the
two interdependent networks, as depicted by the snap-
shots in Fig. 2, depends significantly on the value of α.
For α = 0.01 (panel a), where the bias in the utility func-
p-3
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Fig. 4: Normalized critical synergy factor r2c, required for full
cooperator dominance on network A, in dependence on α. For
comparison, dotted green lines depict the normalized value of
the synergy factor r1 = 0.745 (r2 = 1.1) where the full D (full
C) is reached on an isolated square lattice at K = 0.5 [42].
tion is the strongest, the difference is the largest, while
for α = 0.4 (panel b), and even more so for α = 0.49
(panel c), the difference in the density of cooperators on
the two networks is vanishing. According to the definition
of utility (see Eq. 1), at α = 0.5 the difference vanishes
completely (not shown). By trying to infer the aggregate
level of cooperation on both networks, however, it can be
deduced that the interval of r where cooperators and de-
fectors coexist is virtually independent of α. With the aim
of quantifying more accurately the impact of different α
values on the evolution of public cooperation, we there-
fore focus on the normalized (with G) critical value of the
synergy factor r2c, where the pure C phase (fC = 1) is
reached on network A. These critical values are marked by
small red arrows in Fig. 3.
Quantifying accurately the impact of different values of
α are results presented in Fig. 4, where critical r2c val-
ues, along with the thresholds for cooperator and defector
dominance as obtained on a single square lattice, are de-
picted. As already indicated in Fig. 3, the largest impact
on the evolution of public cooperation is obtained when
the bias in the utility function is the strongest (in the
vicinity of α = 0). Here r2c approaches r1, indicating
that the population experiences a discontinuous transi-
tion from a pure D to a pure C phase. Note that the
evolution on network A becomes totally random at α = 0,
because changes in the player’s strategy and its utility
become completely independent. In the opposite limit,
when α = 0.5, the evolution on both networks becomes
statistically identical, and moreover, is almost the same
as reported previously for a single square lattice. Con-
sequently, r2c(α = 0.5) ≈ r2, indicating that to connect
two graphs by means of a symmetric utility function will
not result in a significant change of the behavior that is
principally determined by the topology of a single graph.
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Fig. 5: Difference between the aggregated level of cooperation
on both interdependent networks and the level of cooperation
as obtained for an isolated square lattice ∆fC in dependence on
the normalized synergy factor r/G, as obtained for α = 0.01.
Since it would be possible that the biased consideration
of payoffs in the utility function promotes the evolution
of cooperation only on network A, while at the same time
potentially having negative consequences for public coop-
eration on network B, it is also instructive to examine the
aggregate improvement in the evolution of public coopera-
tion. Especially so to eliminate possible doubts related to
whether the interdependence truly promotes cooperative
behavior, or maybe it rather just rearranges the strate-
gies, while in fact the overall level of cooperation on both
networks is determined exclusively by the value of r as
on a single (isolated) network. For this purpose, we plot
in Fig. 5 the difference between the overall level of co-
operation and the level of cooperation as obtained for a
single square lattice. As the figure shows, the promotion
of cooperation is indeed a real consequence of the inter-
dependence by means of the biased utility function. The
averaged level of cooperation on both interdependent net-
works exceeds the level observed on a single square lattice
across the whole span of r values where a mixed C+D
phase is possible. Note that the impact of biased utility
becomes negligible on network B (A) if the population on
the network A (B) arrives at an ordered (full D or full
C) state. In that case the evolution on network B (A)
becomes similar to that on a single network because all
the players will gain the same additional payoff from the
corresponding players on network A (B). In this way the
feedback between the strategy change and the local success
of a player is recovered. However, if staying in the mixed
strategy region, the support is the strongest when the con-
ditions for the survival of cooperators are worst, i.e. when
the synergy factor of collaborative efforts is small.
To understand the origin of the reported promotion of
cooperation we refer back to results presented in Fig. 2, in
particular to the large difference in the characteristic time
scales related to the pace of evolution on networks A and
p-4
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Fig. 6: Simultaneous time evolution of fC on networks A and
B (as denoted), obtained for α = 0.01 and r/G = 0.76 if start-
ing from a random initial state. Inset shows the evolution
of frequencies for strategy pairs (as denoted) of corresponding
players on the two networks.
B, which we also quantify more accurately in Fig. 6. Start-
ing from a random initial state, the fraction of cooperators
starts decaying first. This is a well-known consequence of
the random distribution of strategies, which is beneficial
for defectors since they can easily exploit the vicinity of
cooperators and hence spread efficiently [12, 43]. The in-
vasion of defectors on network A, however, is very much
retarded. There the minimum of fC is reached an order
of magnitude later, but even more importantly, the min-
imal fraction of cooperators reached is much higher than
on network B (see Fig. 6). The bridle of the aggressive
invasion of defectors is a straightforward consequence of
the biased utility function, which suppresses the feedback
between the strategy update and the possible payoff en-
largement of a player. More precisely, strategy invasions
on network A are predominantly dictated by the payoffs
of the corresponding players on network B. Consequently,
a defector on network A, who might take advantage from
the vicinity of cooperators cannot invade efficiently, be-
cause the corresponding distribution of strategies in the
same area on network B may be very different. On the
other hand, on network B, where the players are focused
predominantly on maximizing their own payoffs, the feed-
back between the dynamics of evolution and the utility
function that drives this evolution remains almost com-
pletely intact. The stationary density of cooperators as a
function of r on network B is therefore very similar to the
one reported for the traditional single network case [42],
especially for low values of α. Surviving cooperators who
manage to prevail against the initial invasions of defectors
organize themselves into compact domains, thereby ob-
taining the support (spatial reciprocity) needed to spread
in the sea of defectors. The significantly different time evo-
lutions of fC on the two networks are also conspicuous at
this stage of the game. While the stationary mixed C+D
phase on network B is reached after ∼ 103 MCS, the evo-
lution on network A is not just significantly slower (lasts
ten times longer), but it is also more beneficial for cooper-
ation. This can be further corroborated by the evolution
of possible strategy pairs of corresponding players in the
two networks during the microscopic organization (inset of
Fig. 6). Results indicate that cooperation start spreading
only when defectors run out of cooperators to exploit, i.e.
when the number of DA −DB pairs reaches the maximum
value. Thereafter, both CA −DB and CA − CB pairs start
spreading simultaneously. It is crucial to note that coop-
erators on network B cannot survive if their partners (cor-
responding players) on network A are defectors (DA − CB
falls). Evidently, although the slowing down of evolution
by suppressed feedback is a strategy-neutral intervention
into the dynamics, it still has very different consequences
for the success (spreading) of the two competing strategies.
Similar features were earlier observed when the strategy
teaching [44] or strategy learning capacities of players [45]
were considered as being time-dependent. More generally,
present results support the comprehensively accepted as-
sumption that the different time scales in microscopic dy-
namics may relevantly influence the evolution of coopera-
tion in complex systems [24, 43, 46–50]. We conclude that
to consider the more realistic interdependent networks of-
fers a new phenomenon when spontaneous separation of
time scales emerges exclusively due to the interdependence
between the two networks as defined by the biased utility
function.
Summary. – In sum, we have shown that the study
of evolution of public cooperation on interdependent net-
works can provide new insights as to why selfish and unre-
lated individuals venture into collaborative efforts in siz-
able groups. We have exploited the concept of utility func-
tions to create an interdependence between the two net-
works, revealing that biased considerations of payoffs can
lead to the spontaneous separation of characteristic time
scales of evolution by means of a suppressed feedback of
microscopic dynamics that governs the strategy changes.
In so doing, the invasion of defectors on the network where
the pace of evolution is slowed down is obstructed by the
fact that an immediate presence of cooperators on one net-
work is not necessarily linked to a higher utility function
on the other network. Since, however, the clustering of
cooperators into large groups is an inherently slower evo-
lutionary process than the aggressive invasion of individual
defectors, and thus the spreading of cooperative behavior
is not negatively influenced by the interdependence, the
successful evolution of public cooperation is effectively en-
hanced. The presented results help us to understand why
defection is not so successful if the utility to be maximized
is determined not just based on local, i.e. the nearest
neighbors, but also on global, i.e. players that are situated
in another network, sources. Although it is in general ex-
pected that the local structure will promote the evolution
of cooperation by means of spatial reciprocity, sacrificing
p-5
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some fraction of this effect on the expense of preventing
defectors to invade effectively may yield a net advance for
cooperators. The biased utility function introduced here
captures succinctly such a scenario. Although our model
is too simple to be directly applicable to a concrete situ-
ation, it is nevertheless capable to capture the essence of
an interesting everyday example. This has to do with the
fact that humans often rely on “governmental” sources,
and that thus the local and global interests are not neces-
sarily strongly correlated. Withholding taxes or exploiting
social security (assuming within reason) will hardly affect
our interactions with others within our immediate neigh-
borhood. Hence, we may be tempted to cheat on sources
that appear distant or not directly related to our primary
activities. Creating a reliable and robust interdependence
between the two networks, as we demonstrate in this let-
ter, may then provide the necessary leverage to elevate the
awareness of the bigger picture and thus raise the level of
cooperation in the society.
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